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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JODY DALE PARKE, : Case No. 20070840-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Illegal 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2007), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon 
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (effective February 7, 2008) 
(previously codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002)). See Addendum A 
(Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred by denying Parke's motion to suppress because 
the police officer's Terry frisk of him and his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Standard of Review: "In an appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence," this Court will "'review the trial court's factual findings for clear 
error'" and will '"review its conclusions of law for correctness.'" Salt Lake City v. 
Bench, 2008 UT App 30, f^5, 177 P.3d 655 (quoting State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 
Tfl 1, 162 P.3d 1106). '"In search and seizure cases, no deference is granted to . . . the 
[trial] court regarding the application of law to underlying factual findings.'" IdL (quoting 
State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f?, 147 P.3d 425) (alteration in original); see State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ 15, 103 P.3d 699 (holding Utah appellate courts apply "non-
deferential standard" when "reviewing the reasonableness of a traffic stop and protective 
search, or 'Terry' frisk'" (quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^[1, 78 P.3d 590)). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 30-37 (Motion and Memorandum to 
Suppress); 107-10 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law): 122 (Motion Hearing). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are determinative of the issue on appeal. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if 
he reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Parke was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third 
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degree felony. R. 1-2. On June 14, 2007, the trial court held a preliminary hearing and 
bound Parke over as charged. R. 24-25; 38-51; see Addendum B. 
On July 10, 2007, Parke filed a motion to suppress "all evidence obtained in this 
case" because the frisk violated his "Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
search and seizure." R. 30. Specifically, Parke argued that the evidence seized during 
the frisk of him and his vehicle should be suppressed because the officer conducted the 
frisk without a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was armed or presently 
dangerous. R. 31-35. He also argued that the evidence seized incident to his subsequent 
arrest should be suppressed because it was fruit of the poisonous tree. R. 36-37. 
After receiving the State's memorandum in opposition, the trial court heard oral 
argument. R. 122. There, Parke argued that the frisk was unjustified because the stop 
occurred in a "movie theater parking lot," where "there were a number of cars, a number 
of individuals" present. R. 122:5. Plus, he "didn't do anything out of the ordinary with 
the normal traffic stop." R. 122:5. He, like any person during a traffic stop, may have 
been reaching for his identification or car registration, or turning off the ignition. R. 
122:5-6. In response, the State pointed out that it was "just for that very reason" that a 
"prudent person lays both hands on the steering wheel until told to do otherwise by the 
officer." R. 122:6. It then argued the frisk was justified because the stop was in a 
dangerous area and in the evening, and Parke was moving around and got agitated when 
Officer Anderson ordered him to put his hands outside the vehicle. R. 122:7. 
Following argument, the trial court denied Parke's motion. R. 107-10; 122:12-14; 
see Addenda C and D. Although the case represented "a very close question," the trial 
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court ruled for the State because "an officer, in today's reality, has an objective, 
reasonable basis to fear for his or her life every time a motorist is stopped. A traffic stop 
is, after all, a confrontation." R. 122:12-13. 
[W]hen they also say that officer safety is the primary objective in 
justifying an officer's right to perform a pat-down search, I don't think an 
officer ought to have to second-guess or ought to say, oh, he's reaching for 
his wallet as opposed to reaching for a weapon or reaching for drugs. . . . I 
don't have any scientific evidence, I don't know of any objective test that 
says when motorists are pulled over, that most people hold onto the steering 
wheel or sit still or put their hands in their lap. I don't know. I do know, in 
my own experience, I just sat there and waited for the officer to show up. 
R. 122:13. "Having said that, once the officer's safety is an issue, I think they have that 
right to do a pat-down and everything else that followed after that can come in. If they're 
looking for weapons and they're concerned about additional weapons, then they can open 
the door and look for that and because the narcotics, at that point, were in plain view, fell 
out of the car, . . . they can come in as well." R. 122:14. 
Relying on the evidence elicited at the preliminary hearing, the trial court made 
these written findings of fact: 
2. Police Officer, Jimmy Cole Anderson, of the Salt Lake Police 
Department witnessed [Parke] pull out of a parking lot of a gas station onto 
the main roadway without stopping or checking for traffic at 310 East 3300 
South in Salt Lake County. 
3. Officer Anderson initiated a traffic stop and [Parke] stopped in the 
parking lot of the Century Theatres near 300 East 3300 South. Officer 
Anderson testified that in his experience this location is a dangerous area 
for police officers to work. 
4. Once stopped, the Officer saw [Parke] begin to make shoulder 
movements and reach for his waistband area. 
5. Anderson ordered [Parke] to place his hands outside the window. 
Based on the experience of the officer, he was afraid that [Parke] might be 
trying to conceal and/or reach for a weapon. 
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6. [Parke] then became agitated and questioned the instructions 
given by Anderson. Nevertheless, [Parke] complied with the instructions. 
7. After he received back-up, Officer Anderson approached the 
driver and asked him for his identification and to step out of the vehicle for 
a weapons pat-down of his person. 
8. During the pat down search, Anderson felt an object contained 
within [Parke's] pocket which Anderson thought to be a knife. Anderson 
then asked [Parke] if there was a knife in the pocket before retrieving the 
object. [Parke] confirmed that the object was a knife, at which time 
Anderson retrieved the knife and placed it in his own pocket. The knife 
was connected with a chain to a capsule. 
9. After retrieving the knife, Anderson opened the door to conduct a 
weapons search of the driver's seat area to ensure that the knife was the 
only weapon available to the defendant. As he opened the door, Anderson 
saw a pink baggie between the driver's seat and the door, about to fall out 
of the car. The officer recognized that the baggie contained a crystallized 
substance which appeared to be methamphetamine. 
10. Anderson did not move anything around in the vehicle to see the 
baggie. The officer then handcuffed [Parke] and searched him incident to 
arrest. It was during that search when the officer discovered that the 
capsule contained additional methamphetamine. 
R. 107-08. The trial court then reached these conclusions of law: 
4. Anderson testified that the area in which [Parke] was stopped was 
inherently dangerous. This belief, based on experience and training along 
with movements made by [Parke], reaching for his waistband area and 
shoulder movement, coupled with his agitated state and apparent questioning 
nature toward Anderson, properly led him to believe that [Parke] might be 
armed and dangerous. Anderson was concerned with his immediate safety 
and took the appropriate steps to protect himself and others that may have 
been in the area. 
5. An officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable 
belief that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of 
weapons. 
6. Because the knife was discovered and the officer previously noted 
[Parke's] agitated state, it was proper to conclude that he might well be 
dangerous. Therefore, if probable cause did not exist, Anderson was still 
justified in searching the vehicle due to the perceived dangerousness of 
'[Parke |. 
7. The methamphetamine was located in a baggie between the 
driver's seat and the door in plain view after the door was opened. Anderson 
5 
was not required to ignore the substance. After this discovery, Anderson 
properly placed [Parke] under arrest. 
8. The search of the capsule attached to the knife was justified 
because [Parke] was then under arrest and search of the capsule was 
subsequent to that arrest. 
R. 109-10. 
Thereafter, Parke entered a Sery plea to one count of illegal possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of 
his motion to suppress. R. 97; 103. The trial court then sentenced Parke to a term "not to 
exceed five years" in prison. R. 98. Parke filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 111. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This statement of facts is taken from the preliminary hearing transcript located at 
R. 38-51. At the time of the preliminary hearing, Officer Jimmy Cole Anderson had been 
an officer with the South Salt Lake City Police Department for approximately four years. 
R. 39. During that time, he had been involved in over fifty methamphetamine arrests or 
investigations. R. 40. He said that the area he patrols is "very dangerous." R. 41. 
On May 2, 2007, at about 9:30 pm, it was dark outside and Officer Anderson was 
in the vicinity of 3300 South and State Street. R. 40-41. There, he "saw a vehicle pull 
out of [a gas station] parking lot onto the main roadway without stopping and checking 
for traffic." R. 41. He initiated a traffic stop. R. 41. The vehicle pulled into the Century 
Theater parking lot and stopped. R. 41. 
Parke, the driver, was alone in the vehicle. R. 42. Officer Anderson saw Parke 
move his shoulder as if he was "reaching towards [the] waistband area." R. 41. Based on 
his "past experiences," Officer Anderson believed that people making "those 
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movements" were "concealing either weapons or narcotics." R. 41-42. In order to 
"approach safely," Officer Anderson ordered Parke "to put his hands outside the 
window." R. 42. Parke "became somewhat agitated," but complied with Officer 
Anderson's order. R. 42. Officer Anderson concluded Parke was somewhat agitated 
from "his voice" and because he questioned the order. R. 42. 
Another officer saw Officer Anderson "on the traffic stop" and stopped to offer 
backup. R. 42. Officer Anderson approached the vehicle and asked the driver "directly 
just to step out of the vehicle where I was gonna perform a weapons search of his 
person." R. 42. The driver exited the vehicle and Officer Anderson frisked him. R. 43. 
Officer Anderson felt what appeared to be a "little pocket knife" in Parke's pocket. 
R. 43, 47. He asked Parke "if that was a knife and [Parke] said it was." R. 43. Officer 
Anderson "then went into the pocket and retrieved" the pocket knife. R. 43. The pocket 
knife was a key chain. R. 47. "[I]t had a chain hooked to it with a little capsule." R. 43, 
47. It may also have held keys. R. 47. 
The backup officer then watched Parke as Officer Anderson searched "the driver's 
seat area" for weapons. R. 43. When he opened the door, Officer Anderson saw "a pink 
baggie of a white crystallized substance" lying "between the door and driver's seat." R. 
43,49. He believed the substance was methamphetamine. R. 44. Parke was then 
arrested, "handcuffed," and "searched incident to arrest." R. 44, 49. A second "baggie of 
a white crystallized substance" was "found in the capsule that was connected to the knife 
by a chain." R. 44. The vehicle was not stolen, but Officer Anderson impounded it 
because Parke was not the registered owner. R. 48-49. Later, the crystallized substance 
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tested "positive for methamphetamine." R. 46. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse because the trial court erred by denying Parke's motion 
to suppress. An officer may perform a protective frisk only when he reasonably believes 
a person is armed and presently dangerous. The reasonableness of a frisk is evaluated 
objectively according to the totality of the circumstances. The officer must be able to 
point to specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion. 
In this case, the trial court erred by upholding the frisk because the totality of the 
circumstances show that the frisk was not justified by a reasonable suspicion that Parke 
was armed and presently dangerous. Nothing about the nature of the crime being 
investigated or the time and place of the stop reasonably suggested that Parke was armed 
and presently dangerous. Within this context, Parke's shoulder movement and compliant 
(but somewhat agitated) demeanor did not create a reasonable suspicion that he was 
armed and presently dangerous. Further, even if the circumstances of the stop created a 
reasonable suspicion, Officer Anderson mitigated the danger by ordering Parke to put his 
hands outside the vehicle. If, for some reason, ordering Parke to put his hands outside the 
vehicle only partially mitigated the danger, then Officer Anderson could have safely 
dispelled any remaining danger by ordering Parke to exit the vehicle. Because the frisk 
was unnecessary to dispel any reasonable suspicion of danger, Lhis Court should hold it 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 
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ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY RULING THE FRISK DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the 'right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (quoting U.S. 
Const, amend. IV). "'[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
"[A] search Ms a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person' and should not 
be taken lightly.'" State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,1J13, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)). Accordingly, an officer "may perform a protective frisk" 
only when he has "a valid reason for stopping the person" and he "reasonably believes 
[the] person is 'armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others.'" Warren, 2003 
UT 36 at Tfl3 (citations omitted); see Brake, 2004 UT 95 at |^26 (holding "a search will be 
valid only if the officer reasonably believes both that the suspect is dangerous, and that he 
may obtain immediate control of weapons" (citations omitted)); Warren, 2003 UT 36 at 
}^13 ("The sole purpose for allowing the frisk is to protect the officer and other 
prospective victims by neutralizing potential weapons." (citations omitted)); cf Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (2003) ("A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or 
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any other person is in danger."); State v. Roybal 716 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) (holding 
section 77-7-16 must be interpreted to meet "constitutional requirements of Terry"). 
The reasonableness of a frisk is "evaluated objectively according to the totality of 
the circumstances." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at 1fiU4, 25 (citations omitted). "To determine 
reasonableness, a court should question whether 'the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that the action taken was appropriate.'" Id. at 1J14 (citations omitted). Although "the 
officer's subjective belief may be a factor in the objective analysis," it "is not enough 
alone to justify a protective frisk." Id. at ^15-16, 20-21. Rather, "the officer must be 
able to point to specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id, at ^14 (citation omitted). In other words, when 
"determining reasonableness, 'due weight must be given, not to [an officer's] inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to specific reasonable inferences which 
[an officerj is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.'" Id. (citation 
omitted) (alterations in original). "cIf a protective search goes beyond what is necessary 
to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be 
suppressed.'" Id. at ^13 (citations omitted). 
In this case, two of the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. See 
infra at Part A. Moreover, the trial court erred by upholding the frisk because the totality 
of the circumstances show that the frisk was not justified by a reasonable suspicion that 
Parke was armed and presently dangerous. See infra at Part B. Accordingly, this Court 
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should suppress all of the evidence discovered in this case because its discovery was a 
direct result of the illegal search. See infra at Part C. 
A. Two of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Clearly Erroneous. 
"A court's findings are clearly erroneous '"if the findings are against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court is convinced that a mistake has been 
made.'"" In re T.M., 2006 UT App 435, [^14, 147 P.3d 529 (citations omitted); see In re 
Z.D., 2006 UT 54,1HJ23-24, 147 P.3d 401. In this case, two of the trial court's findings 
are against the clear weight of the evidence. 
First, the trial court found that Officer Anderson "witnessed the defendant pull out 
of a parking lot of a gas station onto the main roadway without stopping or checking for 
traffic." R. 107 (emphasis added). Officer Anderson, however, testified that he saw the 
vehicle "pull out of the parking lot onto the main roadway without stopping and checking 
for traffic." R. 41 (emphasis added). Officer Anderson did not testify that Parke pulled 
out of the parking lot without checking for traffic, only that he pulled out without coming 
to a complete stop. R. 41. Contrary to this evidence, the trial court's finding says that 
Parke pulled out of the parking lot without checking for traffic, thereby implying that he 
was driving wildly and without regard for approaching traffic. R. 107. 
Second, regarding "the parking lot of the Century Theatres near 300 East 3300 
South," the trial court found that "Officer Anderson testified that in his experience this 
location is a dangerous area for police officers to work." R. 107 (emphasis added). 
Officer Anderson, however, only testified, "In our area . . . it's a very dangerous area that 
we work." R. 41. He did not explain what he meant by "area," identify the Century 
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Theaters parking lot in particular as a dangerous location, or say whether the parking lot 
is dangerous at 9:30 pm which, as argued below, presumably is a time when it is lit and 
populated with movie-goers entering and leaving the theaters. R. 41. Rather, Officer 
Anderson's testimony broadly identifies the area that Officer Anderson patrols as a 
dangerous area without saying how large that area is or what is dangerous about it. R. 41. 
Despite this lack of detail, the trial court found that the Century Theaters parking lot itself 
is a dangerous place. R. 107. 
B. The Frisk Violated the Fourth Amendment Because It Was Unreasonable 
Under the Totality of the Circumstances. 
The trial court held the frisk was lawful under the Fourth Amendment because: 
[Officer] Anderson testified that the area in which the defendant was 
stopped was inherently dangerous. This belief, based on experience and 
training along with movements made by the defendant, reaching for his 
waistband area and shoulder movement, coupled wilh his agitated state and 
apparent questioning nature toward Anderson, properly led him to believe 
that the defendant might be armed and dangerous. 
R. 109. It then held that the evidence found during and after the frisk was admissible. R. 
109-10. At the motion to suppress hearing, the trial court stated that "this is a very close 
question." R. 122:12. It then explained its decision to deny the motion to suppress: 
I don't think an officer ought to have to second-guess or ought to say, oh, 
he's reaching for his wallet as opposed to reaching for a weapon or 
reaching for drugs. . . . I don't have any scientific evidence, I don't know 
of any objective test that says when motorists are pulled over, that most 
people hold onto the steering wheel or sit still or put their hands in their lap. 
1 donT know. I do know, in my own experience, I just sat there and waited 
for the officer to show up. 
I think if we were to say an officer couldn't go further if a defendant 
moved, . . . then what happens is that officers, when somebody makes a 
move for, like this reaching for their back pocket, we don't know if it's a 
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weapon or a wallet. I don't think officers should have to second-guess that 
or be penalized for that. 
R. 122:13. 
The trial court's reasoning is incorrect. A frisk is not justified every time an 
officer sees a person move during a traffic stop. See State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 661, 
665 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). To hold otherwise would mean that a frisk is justified in 
virtually every traffic stop, no matter how benign. See People v. Cassel, 100 Cal. Rptr. 
520, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that fast hand movement did not justify frisk 
because allowing officers to "routinely search for weapons in all such instances would . . 
. constitute an intolerable and unreasonable' intrusion into the privacy of the vast 
majority of peaceable citizens who travel by automobile"). To the contrary, the 
reasonableness of a frisk depends on "the totality of the circumstances." Warren, 2003 
UT 36 at ffi[14, 25 (citations omitted). 
The totality of the circumstances in this case did not create a reasonable suspicion 
that Parke was "'armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others.'" Warren, 2003 
UT 36 at ^13 (citation omitted). As explained below, nothing about the nature of the 
crime being investigated or the time and place of the stop suggested that Parke was armed 
and presently dangerous. See infra at Parts B. 1, B.2. Within this context, Parke's 
shoulder movement and compliant (but somewhat agitated) demeanor during the stop did 
not create a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and presently dangerous. See infra 
at Part B.3. Further, even if the circumstances of the stop created a reasonable suspicion, 
Officer Anderson mitigated the danger by ordering Parke to put his hands outside the 
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vehicle. See id. If, for some reason, ordering Parke to put his hands outside the vehicle 
only partially mitigated the danger, then Officer Anderson could have dispelled any 
remaining danger by ordering Parke to exit the vehicle. See id. Because Officer 
Anderson could have, without subjecting himself to unnecessary risk, dispelled any 
reasonable suspicion of danger by ordering Parke out of the vehicle, this Court should 
hold the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. 
1. The Nature of the Crime Being Investigated Did Not Create Any 
Reasonable Suspicion that Parke Was Armed or Presently Dangerous. 
An "inherent dangerousness" exists in all "traffic stops " Warren, 2003 UT 36 at 
1J22. But this does not mean that a frisk is justified in every traffic stop. See id. To the 
contrary, a frisk is not justified in most traffic stops because the "danger can be fully or 
partially mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the vehicle.5' TcL 
In a few cases, "the nature of the crime being investigated is sufficient to trigger 
the officer's reasonable suspicion, such as a murder or robbery." Brake, 2004 UT 95 at 
j^32; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (holding frisk permissible where officer suspected 
defendant was involved in "daylight robbery—which, it is reasonable to assume, would 
be likely to involve the use of weapons"); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 
1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (noting officer might reasonably frisk people 
suspected of dealing large quantities of illegal drugs over long distances because they 
"might be armed to protect themselves from criminals who might attempt to crip-off a 
drug dealer"). "[FJor other types of crimes," however, "such as trafficking in small 
quantities of narcotics, possession of marijuana, . . . underage drinking, driving under the 
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influence, and lesser traffic offenses, minor assault without weapons, or vagrancy, there 
must be particular facts which lead the officer to believe that a suspect is armed." Brake, 
2004 UT 95 at TJ32 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In other words, when investigating a minor traffic offense, the officer may not 
claim the "inherent dangerousness of all traffic stops" as justification for a frisk. Warren, 
2003 UT 36 at }^22. Rather, justification for the frisk requires the officer to "observe" the 
suspect and to identify particular facts that lead him to believe the suspect is armed and 
presently dangerous. White, 856 P.2d at 665; see Brake, 2004 UT 95 at *ft32; Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979) ("The 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not 
permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the 
person to be frisked."). 
In this case, "the nature of the crime being investigated" was insufficient to trigger 
Officer Anderson's reasonable suspicion. Brake, 2004 UT 95 at TJ32. Officer Anderson 
stopped Parke for a minor traffic violation—Parke "pull[ed] out of the [gas station] 
parking lot onto the main roadway without stopping and checking for traffic." R. 41. 
Further, there is no evidence that Officer Anderson recognized Parke as a person 
suspected of a violent crime or known for his violent propensity. Compare Ybarra, 444 
U.S. at 93 (holding frisk unconstitutional in part because officers did not "recognize[] 
[defendant] as a person with a criminal history"); White, 856 P.2d at 662-63 (holding 
frisk unconstitutional in part because officers "observed nothing indicative of criminal 
activity and had been given no prior information indicating that defendant was armed"); 
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with Roybal, 716 P.2d at 293 (upholding frisk of defendant who "had been arrested in 
conjunction with [an] earlier shooting incident" that occurred the same day). 
Thus, for the frisk to be justified, "particular facts" must have led Officer 
Anderson to believe that Parke was armed and presently dangerous. Brake, 2004 UT 95 
at *p2. As discussed below, however, the record lacks the necessary particular facts. To 
the contrary, the totality of the circumstances shows that Officer Anderson did not have a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the frisk. 
2. The Time and Place of the Stop Did Not Create Any Reasonable Suspicion 
that Parke Was Armed or Presently Dangerous. 
The time and location of a stop only bolsters reasonableness if it heightens the 
likelihood a person will possess a dangerous weapon. See State v. Despain, 2003 UT 
App 266, fflf2, 12, 74 P.3d 1176 (upholding frisk because stop occurred "about midnight," 
officers were "accosted by an apparently dangerous dog," and defendant exited and 
reentered vehicle without instruction and repeatedly ignored instructions); United States 
v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding frisk because "hour was late, 
the street was dark, the officer was alone, and the suspected crime was a burglary"). 
Further, even where time and place bolster the reasonableness of a frisk, they 
alone do not satisfy the reasonableness test. See United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 
1575 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) ("Of course, that an individual is in a high crime 
neighborhood at night is not enough to support an officer's decision to stop and frisk 
him."); Anderson v. United States, 658 A.2d 1036, 1040 (D.C. 1995) ("The Fourth 
Amendment requires that there must be more than a person being seen in an alley late at 
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night, walking away from the police in a high crime area, who upon being questioned 
puts his hands back in his pockets and acts in a strange manner."). Rather, as explained 
previously, the reasonableness of a frisk depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ffi[14, 25 (citations omitted). 
In this case, neither the time nor the location of the stop supported a suspicion that 
Parke was armed and dangerous. As explained in Part A, Anderson broadly stated that 
the area he patrolled was dangerous. See supra at Part A; R. 41. He did not say that the 
Century Theaters parking lot in particular was dangerous or that it was dangerous at the 
specific time the stop occurred—9:30 pm. R. 41. True, it was dark outside. R. 41. But, 
as argued below, 9:30 pm is a time during which the movie theater would have been open 
for business and, presumably, this means that its parking lot would have been lit and 
populated with movie-goers driving and walking through. R. 122:4-5. 
Most important, Officer Anderson did not explain how Parke's mere presence in 
the parking lot, especially given that he only pulled into the parking lot to comply with 
Officer Anderson's signal to stop, implicated him as part of that area's dangerous 
character. See Brake, 2004 UT 95 at |^37 (reversing search conducted "late at night" in a 
dark and "desolate" location that "attracted unspecified criminal activity" because 
"nothing reasonably implied that the occupants of the vehicles were engaging in criminal 
activity of a type that would place [the officer] at risk"). Thus, like the nature of the 
crime being investigated, as discussed in Part B.l, the time and place of the stop also did 
not create any reasonable suspicion that Parke was armed and presently dangerous. 
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3. When Viewed Within the Totality of the Circumstances, Parke's Shoulder 
Movement and Demeanor During the Stop Did Not Create a Reasonable 
Suspicion that He Was Armed and Presently Dangerous. 
A person's ''movements, turning to the left and to the right, appearing fidgety, 
bending forward, and turning to look at the officer, do not, without more, show a 
reasonable possibility that criminal conduct had occurred or was about to occur." State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 1989). This is because "[w]hen confronted with a 
traffic stop, it is not uncommon for drivers and passengers alike to be nervous and excited 
and to turn to look at an approaching police officer." Id. (citation omitted). Likewise, it 
is not uncommon for the driver to move about as he "attempt[s] to locate a driver's 
license," "prepares] for conversation with the officer by turning down the volume on the 
radio or extinguishing a cigarette," "put[s] away food and beverages," "put[s] on the 
parking brake or do[es] a host of other innocuous things." Id. 
Thus, in Schlosser, our supreme court held that "[a] search based on such common 
gestures and movements is ca mere "hunch," not an articulable suspicion that satisfies the 
Fourth Amendment.'" Id.; cf. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
("c[F]rom the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a 
guilty movement'"; accordingly, "other factors must be shown, which, in the totality of 
the circumstances, would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that there is 
evidence of criminal activity." (citations omitted)). 
Likewise, in White, this Court held that a frisk "based on the suspect's 'common 
gestures and movements'" is a frisk "conducted pursuant to ca mere "hunch," not an 
articulate suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment.'" White, 856 P.2d at 661 
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(quoting Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138). This is because "no one factor," including 
movements by the defendant, "controls a reviewing court's retrospective evaluation of 
whether a frisk was justified at its inception." Id. at 665 (citation omitted). "Instead, the 
police action must be a reasonable invasion of an individual's personal security in light of 
all circumstances of the particular encounter." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in 
original); see Powell v. United States, 649 A.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C. 1994) (holding "'[a] 
vague suspicion based largely on ambiguous conduct. . . where the only reason for the 
stop and investigation is a simple traffic offense without any indication of criminal 
activity either on the part of the driver or passengers . . . [i]n our view do[es] not establish 
a reasonable basis for a frisk'" (alterations in original)). 
If a person's movement is "innocuous," the officer has a "duty to observe" him 
and, if it can "be safely undertaken," to question him. White, 856 P.2d at 661, 663, 665. 
To help secure his safety, the officer may order the person "out of the vehicle." Warren, 
2003 UT 36 at |^T|22, 33. Thereafter, "[i]f by investigation or happenstance the quantum 
of evidence needed to justify a forcible stop" dissipates, "then it is not permissible to 
frisk." White, 856 P.2d at 663 (citation omitted); see id. ("Where a confrontation 
develops in such a manner that questioning can be safely undertaken to substantiate or 
dispel suspicions . . ., preliminary inquiry may be especially appropriate."). In many 
cases, ordering the person out of the vehicle will dispel the need for a frisk by "fully or 
partially mitigat[ing]" the "inherent dangerousness" of the traffic stop. Warren, 2003 UT 
36at1fl[22,33. 
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Applying this reasoning in White, this Court determined that the frisk was 
unconstitutional. Defendant's "' leaning off to his side a little bit'" was an "innocuous" 
gesture. White, 856 P.2d at 661. Even when combined with an informant's tip that he 
was high on cocaine and had been involved in a domestic disturbance earlier that day, 
defendant's "previous arrest for" armed robbery, and defendant's ability to conceal 
weapons in his heavy winter coat, these movements did not justify the frisk, kf at 658, 
661. This is because the totality of the circumstances showed: 
The officers converged on defendant in mid-afternoon, greatly 
outnumbered him and presumably were armed. They observed nothing 
indicative of criminal activity and had been given no prior information 
indicating that defendant was armed. These circumstances, combined with 
defendant's lack of menacing behavior, created an environment in which 
the responding officers could question defendanl without fear for their 
safety. 
Id, at 662-63. 
In other words, the frisk was unnecessary because "[circumstances allowed the 
officers time to reassess the allegations of criminal activity and their initial suspicions of 
danger without being subjected to 'unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.'" 
Id. at 666 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 23). Because the officers could have resolved their 
suspicions "by questioning defendant," this Court "conclude[dJ that the trial court erred 
in deciding that the frisk of defendant was lawful." Id. This is especially true given our 
supreme court's later holding in Warren that the officers, as part of their investigation, 
could have "decreased the inherent dangerousness of the traffic stop" by ordering the 
defendant out of the vehicle. Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^|33. 
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Likewise, the circumstances surrounding the stop in this case allowed Officer 
Anderson time to observe and question Parke without subjecting himself to unnecessary 
risk. Parke pulled into the parking lot and stopped immediately upon Officer Anderson's 
signal. R. 41. As Officer Anderson exited his vehicle, he saw "shoulder movement" as 
Parke appeared to reach toward his "waistband area." R. 41. This was an innocuous 
movement. See Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138; White, 856 P.2d at 661. Parke could have 
been reaching for his identification, turning off the radio, shifting positions, scratching 
himself, or doing any number of non-threatening things. See id.; Holmes, 774 P.2d at 
511 (explaining that '"observer may view'" meaning of gestures "'quite otherwise from 
the actor: not only is his vantage point different, he may even have approached the scene 
with a preconceived notion—consciously or subconsciously—of what gestures he 
expected to see and what he expected them to mean'" (citation omitted)). 
This innocuous movement, even when combined with the fact that it was dark 
outside and that Parke was in an area that Officer Anderson believed was dangerous, was 
not sufficient to justify a frisk. R. 41 The totality of the circumstances show that Parke 
readily obeyed the signal to stop; he was stopped for a minor traffic violation; he was 
alone in the vehicle; he was only stopped in an area that Officer Anderson believed was 
dangerous because that is where Officer Anderson happened to pull him over; as argued 
below, the parking lot was presumably lit and populated with movie-goers because the 
stop occurred during a time that the movie theater was open for business; Officer 
Anderson was a trained and armed police officer; and Officer Anderson was 
accompanied by a trained and armed backup officer. R. 41-43; 122:4-5. 
21 ' 
If all of this did not dispel Officer Anderson's suspicion, then Officer Anderson 
dissolved any remaining suspicion by ordering Parke to put his hands out the window. 
See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^1 (recognizing "that all traffic stops are inherently 
dangerous," but "any reduction in this danger resulting from ordering the person out of 
the vehicle before performing the frisk should also be factored into the analysis."). 
Parke readily complied with Officer Anderson's order. R. 42. While doing so, he 
became "somewhat agitated" and asked why he had to put his hands out the window. R. 
42. But this response was not a protest or a threat. R. 42. To the contrary, it was one of 
several natural responses a person might have when he is stopped for a minor traffic 
violation and is suddenly ordered to put his hands outside the vehicle. See Holmes, 774 
P.2d at 511. Thereafter, Parke did not put his hands back into the vehicle or make any 
other movements. R. 42. To the contrary, he continued to comply with Officer 
Anderson's orders, as he had done from the beginning. R. 42; compare Ybarra, 444 U.S. 
at 93 (holding frisk unconstitutional where defendant "made no gestures or other actions 
indicative of an intent to commit an assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not 
threatening"); with United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(upholding frisk where defendant kept right hand in pocket, "where a weapon could be 
located," even when he opened door and even though he had beer in other hand). 
In sum, at the time of the frisk, Officer Anderson was faced with a person who had 
readily complied with every order that he had made and whose hands were outside the 
vehicle where he could see them. R. 41-42. When combined with the totality of the 
circumstances outlined above, no reasonable suspicion existed that Parke was armed and 
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presently dangerous. Compare White, 856 P.2d at 663; with State v. Sosa, 1999 UT App 
218, 1999 WL 33244770, at *1 (mem. decision) (upholding frisk where, in addition to 
suspects' movements during stop, vehicle did not stop immediately after officer signaled, 
suspects were moving empty ammunition box before stop and appeared to be hiding 
something, driver had outstanding warrant, and both suspects lied about their identities) 
(attached at addendum E); State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 648-49 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(upholding frisk of vehicle where defendant "lean[ed] down and to his right several 
times" and, "[a]t least twice, . . . bent over so far that his head was no longer visible to the 
trooper" because officer questioned defendant about his movements, defendant's 
explanation was suspicious, and defendant, after saying he was not armed, admitted he 
had a gun in the vehicle); State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding "Defendant's speeding, the remote area, the early hour, defendant's apparent 
shaking as if he were 'on something,' the presence of a rifle, and defendant's furtive 
retrieval of a bag combine to create a reasonable belief that defendant presented a threat 
to [deputy's] safety"). 
Rather, as in White, the record shows that Officer Anderson could have safely 
observed and questioned Parke. In particular, he could have asked Parke why he moved 
his shoulder and/or whether he had any weapons. These simple questions could have 
been asked safely and likely would have substantiated or dispelled any suspicion that 
Parke was armed and presently dangerous. See, e.g., White, 856 P.2d at 663 (holding 
"defendant's lack of menacing behavior, created an environment in which the responding 
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officers could question defendant without fear for their safety" and that questioning 
defendant could have substantiated or dispelled their suspicions). 
If, for some reason, questioning Parke did not dissolve all suspicion, then Officer 
Anderson could have safely ordered Parke out of the vehicle. "[T]he inherent 
dangerousness of all traffic stops. . . can be fully or partially mitigated by ordering the 
occupants out of the vehicle" because "'[establishing a face-to-face confrontation 
diminishes the possibility, otherwise substantial, that the driver can make unobserved 
movements.'" Warren, 2003 UT 36 at YP2, 27 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U.S. 106, 110 (1977)) (third alteration in original). In particular, "[i]n simple traffic stops 
where other indicia of dangerousness are absent, ordering the occupants of the vehicle out 
of the car clearly mitigates the inherent dangerousness of the stop " Id. at ^ 27. 
Plus, removing Parke from the vehicle would have allowed Officer Anderson to 
more closely observe Parke. This observation would have re\ealed whether Parke was 
wearing clothing that could conceal a weapon, particularly in the area of the waistband 
where he had been reaching; or whether there were any bulges in Parke's clothing that 
indicated a weapon might be present. See State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, f^25, 68 
P.3d 1043 (holding "that reasonable suspicion may be generated by 'a suspect with a 
bulge in his clothing that appears to be a weapon'" (citation omitted) (emphasis in 
original)); State v. Rochell 850 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (upholding frisk in 
part because defendant "had a bulge in his pocket" that officer believed "could have been 
a weapon," and "when asked whether he had any weapons, [defendant] 'was hesitant in 
answering no'"). 
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In sum, a frisk '"is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person' and should 
not be taken lightly." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at TJ13 (citation omitted); see White, 856 P.2d 
at 665 (holding that "authority to permit a protective frisk for weapons 'must be narrowly 
drawn'" (citation omitted)); Lafond, 2003 UT App 101 at ^18 (same). It must not be 
based on an officer's '"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" Warren, 
2003 UT 36 at Tfl4 (citation omitted). Rather, it must be based on "'specific reasonable 
inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.'" Id (citation omitted). As demonstrated above, Officer Anderson's frisk 
was not based on reasonable suspicion that Parke was armed and presently dangerous. 
The totality of the circumstances shows that he could have safely observed and 
questioned Parke in order to substantiate or dispel his suspicions, but he chose not to. R. 
38-51. Instead, even though Parke had readily complied with all of his orders and 
Parke's hands were outside the vehicle where he could see them, Officer Anderson 
immediately frisked Parke. R. 38-51. Thus, this Court should hold that the frisk violated 
the Fourth Amendment. 
To hold otherwise would mean that anyone who is stopped in the area that Officer 
Anderson patrols at 9:30 pm and moves her shoulders during the stop—to reach for her 
identification, turn off the radio, shift position, scratch herself, or do any other innocuous 
thing—may be frisked. See Cassel, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (holding fast hand movement 
did not justify frisk because allowing officers to "routinely search for weapons in all such 
instances would . . . constitute an 'intolerable and unreasonable' intrusion into the privacy 
of the vast majority of peaceable citizens who travel by automobile"); cf. People v. 
. . 25 
Moray, 35 Cal. Rptr. 432, 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (holding if "arm motion" during stop 
constituted "probable cause" to search "then practically every motorist in California who 
receives or is about to receive a traffic citation will be subject to having his person and 
his automobile searched by the traffic officer—such is fortunately not the law"). 
C. This Court Should Suppress All of the Evidence Found In This Case Because 
Its Discovery Was a Direct Result of the Illegal Frisk. 
"Under the exclusionary rule, 'evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal 
search and seizure.'" State v. Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37, ^[11, 65 P.3d 314 (quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). "The exclusionary rule 'also 
prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence . . . that is the product of. . . or that is 
otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search.'" Id. (quoting Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988)); see also State v. McGrath, 928 P.2d 1033, 
1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("To deter violations of Fourth Amendment rights, . . . 
illegally-acquired evidence is inadmissible." (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383, 398 (1914))); Warren, 2003 UT 36 at Tfl3 ("Tf a protective search goes beyond what 
is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its 
fruits will be suppressed.'" (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993))). 
To determine whether evidence should be suppressed, courts "focus on whether the 
evidence resulted primarily from the '"exploitation of [the] illegality'" or '"by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."'" McGrath, 928 P.2d at 
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1036 (alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 
(1963) (citation omitted)). 
In this case, this Court should suppress all of the evidence gathered against Parke 
because its discovery was a direct result of the illegal frisk. Officer Anderson found the 
pocketknife with the capsule attached when he frisked Parke's body and found the first 
baggie of methamphetamine when he expanded the frisk to the interior of the vehicle. R. 
43-44, 49; cf Brake, 2004 UT 95 at |^25 ("Under Utah law, a warrantless automobile 
search requires probable cause and exigent circumstances unless it satisfies traditionally 
recognized justifications for protecting the safety of police or the public or preventing the 
destruction of evidence." (citations omitted)). As explained above, the frisk violated the 
Fourth Amendment. See supra at Part B. Therefore, the pocketknife with the capsule 
attached, the baggie, and the baggie's contents should be suppressed. ;See Zesiger, 2003 
UTApp37at^ l l . 
Thereafter, Parke was arrested for possession of the baggie found during the illegal 
frisk. R. 44, 49. During the search incident to that arrest, Officer Anderson found the 
second baggie of methamphetamine located inside the capsule attached to the 
pocketknife. R. 44. Thus, that baggie and its contents must also be suppressed because 
its discovery was the direct result of the illegal frisk. See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^13; 
McGrath, 928 P.2d at 1036; Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37 at j^l 1. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Parke's conviction because the trial court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress the evidence taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
SUBMITTED this Jj_ day of April, 2008. 
LORI r-SEPPr^ ' 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
Change of Plea Note 
This is a Sery Plea. 
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Case No: 071903540 
Date: Sep 10, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
This commitment is to run concurrent to any other sentence. 
State is advised that they are to prepare an order regarding the 
Motion to Suppress Hearing previously heard on 8-20-07. 
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STATE OF UTAH V, JODY DALE PARKE 
Case No. 071903540FS 
June 14, 2007 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
JUDGE SHEILA MCCLEVE 
Attorney for Plaintiff : Byron F. Burmester (ATP) 
Attorney for Defendant : Michael I). Misncr (ATD) 
1 J: Well let's do it. Which is it? 
2 ATD: Your Honor it's the matter of Jody Parke. He's in custody. 
3 J: State vs. Parke. Do we have a prosecutor? 
4 ATD: Mr. Burmester I think is out getting his witnesses. 
5 J: Okay. He disappeared. No there he is. 
6 ATP: (inaudible) have two witnesses Your Honor, 
7 J: We need a defendant, just one second. When we get the defendant, we'll.. .we'll do it. 
8 So Mr. Park are you right handed or left? 
9 D: I'm left. 
10 J: K. Have a seat there and we'll uncuff your left hand so you can write notes to Mr. 
11 Misner if you need to. 1 have one count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
12 substance, methamphetamine, a third degree felony at 33rd South State. I assume you 
13 waive further reading. 
14 ATD: We do Your Honor. 
15 J: And Mr. Burmester you said you've got two witnesses? 
16 ATP: I do. 
1 
1 J: Go ahead. 
2 ATP: Would you like them both brought up to be sw.. .to be sworn in at the same time. 
3 J: No I figure you just do it unless there's a motion made. 
4 ATP: Sorry. 
5 J: And.. .and that's the way I do it. Oh.. .one at a time. 
6 ATP: Oh one at a time. 
7 J: Unless there's a motion made... 
8 ATP: You first (inaudible). 
9 J: which there hasn't been. 
10 ATP: Yes. 
11 J: Come on up and be sworn. 
12 Witness sworn in. 
13 J: Then just have a seat at the witness stand. I guess that really wasn't clear, you just 
14 proceed as normal calling witnesses (inaudible) unless there's a motion. 
15 ATP: Okay. I'm sorry. 
16 J: Go ahead. 
17 ATP: Please state your full name and spell your last name. 
18 W: Jimmy Cole Anderson, A N D E R S O N . 
19 ATP: Sir a.. .are you a a.. .police officer with South Salt Lake City Police Department? 
20 W: I am. 
21 ATP: How long have you been with South Salt Lake? 
22 W: Approximately 4 years. 
23 ATP: What's your current duty assignment? 
2 
1 W: Patrol Officer canine division. 
2 ATP: K. Urn... Were you serving in that same capacity on May 2nd of this year? 
3 W: Yes. 
4 ATP: And um.. .have you during your career, have you received any training on a.. .drugs? 
5 W: lhave. 
6 ATP: Um.. .How about the drug methamphetamine? 
7 W: lhave. 
8 ATP: And have you a.. .had an opportunity in that training to have methamphetamine shown 
9 to you? 
10 W: Yes I have. 
11 ATP: And a.. .have you had any situations where you've a.. .in.. .in the process of doing your 
12 work as a police officer s...a.. .been involved in an arrest or investigation of 
13 methamphetamine? 
14 W: Yes many... many times. 
15 ATP: About how many? 
16 W: Um.. .1 would say over 50. 
17 ATP: I'm sorry. 
18 W: Over 50. 
19 ATP: Over 50. And have you seen a...methamphetamine that many times? 
20 W: I have. 
21 ATP: Okay. On a.. .May 2nd of this year, did you have an occasion to be in the vicinity of 
22 33rd South and State Street? 
23 W: I was. 
3 
1 ATP: Okay. On that urn.. .is that address in Salt Lake County? 
2 W: It is. 
3 ATP: On that...about what time was it when you were there in May. 
4 W: Um.. .Let me refer to my report here. I know it was in the evening hours at about, yea, 
5 about 9:30. 
6 ATP: So was it dark then? 
7 W: Yes. 
8 ATP: And a.. .did you see some sort of traffic offense or something that drew your attention? 
9 W: I was actually at about 300 East and 3300 South. At 310 East is a location of a.. .of 
10 a.. .gas station. I saw a vehicle pull out of the parking lot onto the main roadway 
11 without stopping and checking for traffic. 
12 ATP: Okay. So what did you do? 
13 W: I then a.. .got behind the vehicle and made a traffic stop at about 3300 South and State 
14 at the Century Theatres parking lot. 
15 ATP: Did the vehicle stop immediately or... 
16 W: A...p... yea... af... it pulled into the dr... into the parking lot of the Century Theatres and 
17 then stopped. 
18 ATP: What did you do next? 
19 W: At that time as I was getting out of the vehicle, 1 saw the driver what appeared to me as 
20 making (inaudible) movements as in reaching towards waistband area. I could sec 
21 shoulder movement um.. .and which caught my attention. In our area...it's a very 
22 dangerous area that we work and a... with those movements in my past experiences 
4 
1 um.. .1 have found people to be concealing either weapons or narcotics. Sol ordered 
2 the driver to put his hands outside the window so I could approach safely. 
3 ATP: Were you outside you car at that point? 
4 W: Iwas. 
5 ATP: Okay. And so did he do that? 
6 W: A.. .He became somewhat agitated. I could tell in his voice and he a.. .questioned my 
7 a.. .instructions a.. .which even raised by suspicions a little bit more. He did comply 
8 though. 
9 ATP: Were there any other occupants besides this driver? 
10 W: No. Just the driver. 
11 ATP: Do you see that driver here in the court today? 
12 W: I do. 
13 ATP: Would you point him out and describe what he's wearing. 
14 W: He's sitting here. He's in a gray jump suit. 
15 ATP: May the record reflect identification Your Honor. 
16 J: Yes. 
17 ATP: So um,. .you said that though agitated the defendant put his hands outside the window, 
18 what happened next? 
19 W: K. Um.. .Another officer a... was.. .had shown up, that's my back up. He just saw me 
20 on the traffic stop and showed up. I approached the vehicle and asked the driver a.. .1 
21 believe for his identification. 1 think I asked him directly just to step out of the vehicle 
22 where I was gonna perform a weapons search of his person so I could deal with him in 
23 a... safety. 
5 
1 ATP: Okay. So did you do that? 
2 W: Yes I asked him to step out. A weapons search was conducted as I was... 
3 ATP: By who? 
4 W: Byrne. 
5 ATP: Okay. 
6 W: Urn.. .1 felt what appeared a.. .to me to be knife in his pocket. Before I went into his 
7 pocket I asked him if thai was a knife and he said it was. I then went into the pocket 
8 and retrieved the knife. Urn.. .On the knife was a.. .connected with a chain and a 
9 capsule. So I then placed that a.. .1 believe I put the laiife in my pocket and then I had 
10 officer, my back up officer, a.. .watch Mr. Parke as I conducted a a.. .weapons search of 
11 the driver's seat area just to make sure that we.. .there was nothing, no weapons there 
12 that could harm us. As I opened the door to perform that search, I could see a pink 
13 baggie of a white crystallized substance. It looked like it was right on the side of the 
14 seat about to fall out of the vehicle so... 
15 ATP: Can you stop for just one second. 
16 W: Go ahead. 
17 J: Go ahead. 
18 ATP: You said you saw a pink baggie where? 
19 W: As you open the door urn,. .right along the frame of the vehicle in the sea.. .in the 
20 driver's seat, there's a...a baggie right there. 
21 ATP: So you didn't have to move anything around or... 
22 W: I didn't. 
23 ATP: K. And a.. .did you.. .did you see what was inside of it? 
6 
1 W: Yea. I recognized the substance as a white crystallized substance which I.. .1 believed 
2 to be methamphetamine. 
3 ATP: So what happened next? 
4 W: At that time, the a.. .defendant was handcuffed and searched incident to arrest. Another 
5 baggie of a white crystallized substance that I believed to be methamphetamine was 
6 also found in the capsule that was connected to the knife by the chain. 
7 ATP: Okay. So did yon do something with those two baggies? 
8 W: They were booked into evidence. I a.. .a.. .Mr. Parke was transported and booked on 
9 the charges. I did not have any a... test kits... 
10 ATP: Uhu. 
11 W: a...to perform a field test kit a... so they were booked into evidence. 
12 ATP: And how did you package them? 
13 W: I put 'em in an envelope and taped it up and initialed it. 
14 ATP: Okay so could you describe those two baggies for me please. 
15 W: A...One was a...a clear baggie that was a little bit larger than the a...other baggie I 
16 would say approximately 2 inches by 2 inches. And the other one was about a inch by 
17 inch and it was a pink baggie. 
18 ATP: The smaller one was.., 
19 W: Both contained the white crystallized substance. 
20 ATP: But you then took those two baggies and placed them into one... 
21 W: Correct, one envelope. 
22 ATP: May I approach the witness Your Honor? 
23 J: Yes. 
7 
1 ATP: I'm handing the witness what has been marked the State's exhibit one. I guess 1 
2 should.. .Do you recognize this sir? 
3 W: Yes. 
4 ATP: And what is that? 
5 W: This is the envelope in which I packaged the nar.. .the a.. .methamphetamine. 
6 ATP: Okay. 
7 W: The baggies. 
8 ATP: Okay. The two baggies. Okay. 
9 W: The two baggies. 
10 ATP: And um.. .does it.. .does it appear to be substantially similar condition than when you 
11 last saw it? 
12 W: Um.. .The bottom has been opened and re-sealed. 
13 ATP: Okay. And how about the top? 
14 W: The top um.. .has been opened and re-sealed. 
15 ATP: Okay, Now do you know who opened and resealed those, that envelope? 
16 W: I do. There was a supplemental report in which the a.. .case manager the detective had 
17 requested um., .our crime lab technician to a.. .field test the baggies. 
18 ATP: Okay so was one of them opened by her? 
19 W: Yes. 
20 ATP: K. And the other one? 
21 W: And the other one was opened by me. 
22 ATP: When? 
23 W: Earlier today. 
8 
1 ATP: Okay. And who was there? 
2 W: A.. You were and also a.. .Danielle who is the crime lab technician. 
3 ATP: It that the a... 
4 W: Danielle Nielson. 
5 ATP: Okay. 
6 ATD: Judge if it'll save time, for purposes of this hearing, we stipulate to chain of custody. 
7 We stipulate to the.. .the crime lab's testing as preliminary a.. .field test that this was 
8 positive for methamphetamine. 
9 J: Is that the stipulation? 
10 ATP: That it is.. .that the urn... yea that the test was... 
11 ATD: That this was methamphetamine. 
12 ATP: Methamphetamine. Yes. 
13 ATD: For purposes of this hearing. 
14 J: Okay. 
15 ATP: So I guess I go get the (inaudible). 
16 J: Urn... 
17 ATP: I guess that would be it. 
18 J: Okay. 
19 ATP: Thank you. 
20 J: Mr. Misner. 
21 ATD: Can you tell me what the statute is for a.. .pulling out of a parking lot without stopping? 
22 W: 1 don't have the statute on hand, I'm sorry. 
9 
1 ATD: Okay. Did you watch him get into the car, pull out.. .1 mean, how much of that did you 
2 see: 
3 W: I just saw him drive the vehicle out of the parking lot. He was coming out of the 
4 parking onto the roadway. At that time, I pulled in behind him. 
5 ATD: Okay I mean, so did you see him like drive 15 feet in the parking lot before exiting onto 
6 the street or did you see two feet of that 5, you know whal I mean. 
7 W: A.. .It was approximately 10 to 20 feet. 
8 ATD: Okay. Um...When you say after... after you got him out of the vehicle you were gonna 
9 do a weapons search. A... What does... what does that weapons search, what does that 
10 phrase mean? 
11 W: It's a. ..urn cursery search the outside of their clothing urn.. .and it's just checking 
12 strictly for weapons. 
13 ATD: Okay. It is actually a search or are you talking about the Terry frisk? 
14 W: The Terry frisk. 
15 ATD: And th...it's a little pocket knife? 
16 W: Correct. 
17 ATD: And it's... it's... it's on some kind of chain or key ring? 
18 W: At that time I could just feel the pocket knife. 
19 ATD: Well once you got it out and and saw it. 
20 W: Right. Yea, it had a chain hooked to it with a little capsule. 
21 ATD: Okay, keys? 
22 W: A.. .1 don't know if there was keys hooked to it. There may have been. 
23 ATD: Okay, what (inaudible)... 
10 
1 W: I didn't document it in my report though so I can't remember. 
2 ATD: What end.. what ended up happening to the knife and the chain? 
3 W: A.. .1 believe it was booked. I'm not exactly sure. I don't know if it was returned to 
4 him or if I booked it. 
5 ATD: Okay. Do you remember any other keys? 
6 W: I can check the involvements. Um.. .There was some keys. 
7 ATD: Okay. Separate from that or it might have been? 
8 W: It could have been I don't.. .I'm not exactly positive. 
9 ATD: Okay. And registration on the vehicle? 
10 W: Um.. .1 don't believe Jody was the registered owner. 
11 ATD: Okay. 
12 W: I think that's the reason why the vehicle was impounded is cuz we couldn't get hold of 
13 the registered owner to pick it up. 
14 ATD: Okay. But it wasn't a stolen vehicle? 
15 W: No. 
16 ATD: Um.. .So then when you say that you have Jody out of the vehicle and you have,. .you 
17 found the knife.... 
18 W: Mhum. 
19 ATD: um... you asked the other off) cer to watch him.... 
20 W: Right. 
21 ATD: while you did a weapons search of the driver area. 
22 W: Right. 
23 ATD: So a terry frisk of the driver's seat. 
11 
1 W: Sure, yes. 
2 ATD: Um.. .And at that point you opened the door to the car. 
3 W: Correct. 
4 ATD: Okay and the baggie that you saw isn't between the two seats, it's between the door and 
5 the seat? 
6 W: Correct. 
7 ATD: I would assume if the car was not registered for him and you were going to impound it 
8 that you would locate the keys to the car and keep the keys as well. 
9 W: Um.. .normally the keys are a.. .the are sent with the vehicle. 
10 ATD: Okay. At what point did you place Jody under arrest? 
11 W: Once I saw the.. .the pink baggie, the baggie between the dooi and driver's seat. 
12 ATD: Okay. 
13 W: And he was placed in the handcuffs. 
14 ATD: Okay. Thank you. I have nothing further Judge. 
15 J: Any redirect? 
16 ATP: Just very short Your Honor. You said that um.. .you told the defense attorney that 
17 on.. .when you saw the car coming towards the road (inaudible) parking lot that you 
18 saw it for 10 or 20 feet. When you first saw that car was it moving or was it stopped? 
19 W: It was moving. 
20 ATP: So it made a (inaudible) when you first saw it was moving? 
21 W: Correct. 
22 ATP. Nothing further. 
23 J: Anything on that? 
12 
1 ATD: (inaudible). 
2 J: You may step down. 
3 W: Thank you. 
4 J: K. Anything else? 
5 ATP- No Your Honor. 
6 J: Slate rests? 
7 ATP: Yes, I'm sorry. The State rests. 
8 ATD: You're a.. .for the record a...Mr. Parke we have.. .we've talked about this before. You 
9 have the right to testify today and we can put on evidence. A.. .It's my advice that we 
10 not do that at this hearing. Are you willing to lake my advice? 
11 D: Yes. 
12 ATD: (inaudible). 
13 J: Submit it. 
14 ATP: Yes. 
15 ATD: We would Judge. 
16 J: Okay. So Mr. Parke they've given me enough evidence today a...to believe that the 
17 illegal possession of meth, a controlled substance occurred and also reason to believe 
18 that you committed it. So I'm gonna order that you stand trial. We'll set it before Judge 
19 Maughan for arraignment and scheduling and that will be... 
20 C: June 25th. 
21 J: 25th of June at 9:00, 9:00 June 25th. 
22 ATP: Thank you. 
23 ATD' Thank you Youi Honor. 
13 
1 J: K. sThank you, we'll excuse you. 
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1 defendant's further agitated state and those things he 
2 articulated were things that caused him concern, and, as it 
3 turns out, were substantiated, because there was a knife. 
4 MR. HOWARD: The fact that there was a knife, your 
5 Honor, is--
6 THE COURT: Yeah. 
7 MR. HOWARD: --it should be disregarded. It's--it's 
8 what happens to lead to the search that's important. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
10 Court will be in recess for abou~ five minutes or so 
11 and come back with a decision. 
12 MR. HOWARD: Thank you. 
13 MR. BURMESTER: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: And then we'll — we'll handle the--is it 
15 Imas matter in just a few minutes. Thank you. 
16 (Recess) 
17 THE COURT: Okay. We're back on the record in State 
18 versus Parke. 
19 I'm sorry to keep you waiting, I was looking for a--
20 a citation and it may be in this case that the State--okay. 
21 It is. 
22 I--I will start by acknowledging that this is a very 
23 close question and--which has caused me to go back and review 
24 it even more, but I--I believe that when the Tenth Circuit has 
25 said that the risk to officer's safety is heightened by the 
12 
1 confrontational nature of the encounter, an officer, in 
2 today's reality, has an objective, reasonable basis to fear 
3 for his or her life every time a motorist is stopped. A 
4 traffic stop is, after all, a confrontation. 
5 I think, based upon that, when they also say that 
6 officer safety is the primary objective in justifying an 
7 officer's right to perform a pat-down search, I don't think an 
8 officer ought to have to second-guess or ought to say, oh, 
9 he's reaching for his wallet as opposed to reaching for a 
10 weapon or reaching for drugs. I think that I--I don't have 
11 any scientific evidence, I don't know of any objective test 
12 that says when motorists are pulled over, that most people 
13 hold onto the steering wheel or sit still or put their hands 
14 in their lap. I don't know. I do know, in my own experience, 
15 I just sat there and waited for the officer to show up. 
16 I think if we were to say an officer couldn't go 
17 further if a defendant moved, what we're trying to define what 
18 constitute a furtive or not furtive, then what happens is that 
19 officers, when somebody makes a move for, like this reaching 
2 0 for their back pocket, we don't know if it's a weapon or a 
21 wallet. I don't think officers should have to second-guess 
22 that or be penalized for that. 
23 So, based on the totality of the circumstances in 
24 this case, I'm going to deny the motion to suppress and see if 
25 you can--the State can prove its case at trial, to see whether 
13 
1 or not a jury believes the officer's side of the testimony or 
2 whether that testimony is sufficient to prove anything beyond 
3 a reasonable doubt. 
4 Having said that, once the officer's safety is an 
5 issue, I think they have that right to do a pat-down and 
6 everything else that followed after that can come in. If 
7 they're looking for weapons and they're concerned about 
8 additional weapons, then they can open the door and look for 
9 that and because the narcotics, at that point, were in plain 
10 view, fell out of the car, they're--they can come in as well. 
11 So, given that, what would you like to do at this 
12 point? 
13 First of allr I'd like Mr. Burmester to prepare 
14 appropriate findings and order on this and then where do you 
15 want to go from here? 
16 MR. HOWARD: Well, your Honor, if the Court would 
17 set the matter for an arraignment? Or he--has the defendant 
18 already been arraigned? 
19 MR. BURMESTER: I think so, yes. 
2 0 MR. HOWARD: Set it for a scheduling conference 
21 then. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. We can do that on--next week, is 
23 that soon enough--does that work for you? 
24 MR. BURMESTER: Okay. That's fine. Your Honor, 
25 it's obviously Mr. Howard's--not Mr. Howard's case, so--
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CaseNo.071903540 
Hon. Paul G. Maughn 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress having been raised in Court in the above entitled matter 
in which a hearing was conducted on August 20, 2007. Defendant was represented by counsel, 
Wes Howard and Michael Misner, and the State was represented by Deputy District Attorney, 
Byron F. Burmester. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Counsel for both the State and Defendant submitted memoranda. Evidence was was 
taken from the transcript of the Preliminary Hearing that was conducted on June 24, 2007. 
2. Police Officer, Jimmy Cole Anderson, of the Salt Lake Police Department witnessed 
the defendant pull out of a parking lot of a gas station onto the main roadway without stopping 
or checking for traffic at 310 East 3300 South in Salt Lake County. 
3. Officer Anderson initiated a traffic stop and the defendant stopped in the parking lot 
of the Century Theatres near 300 East 3300 South. Officer Anderson testified that in his 
experience this location is a dangerous area for police officers to work. 
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Case No. 071903540 
Page 2 
4. Once stopped, the Officer saw the Defendant begin to make shoulder movements and 
reach for his waistband area. 
5. Anderson ordered the defendant to place his hands outside the window. Based on the 
experience of the officer, he was afraid that the defendant might be trying to conceal and/or 
reach for a weapon. 
6. The defendant then became agitated and questioned the instructions given by 
Anderson. Nevertheless, the defendant complied with the instructions. 
7. After he received back-up, Officer Anderson approached the driver and asked him 
for his identification and to step out of the vehicle for a weapons pat-down of his person. 
8. During the pat down search, Anderson felt an object contained within the defendant's 
pocket which Anderson thought to be a knife. Anderson then asked the defendant if there was a 
knife in the pocket before retrieving the object. The defendant confirmed that the object was a 
knife, at which time Anderson retrieved the knife and placed it in his own pocket. The knife 
was connected with a chain to a capsule. 
9. After retrieving the knife, Anderson opened the door to conduct a weapons search of 
the driver's seat area to ensure that the knife was the only weapon available to the defendant. 
As he opened the door, Anderson saw a pink baggie between the driver's seat and the door, 
about to fall out of the car. The officer recognized that the baggie contained a crystallized 
substance which appeared to be methamphetamine. 
10. Anderson did not move anything around in the vehicle to see the baggie. The 
officer then handcuffed the Defendant and searched him incident to arrest. It was during that 
search when the officer discovered that the capsule contained additional methamphetamine. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. During investigative stops, including traffic stops, an officer may perform a pat-
down search where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous 
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. 
2. Officer safety is the primary objective justifying an officer's right to perform a pat-
down search. 
3. Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances, taking into 
account an officer's reasonable inferences based on training, experience, and common sense. 
The Court's analysis may include the subjective belief of the officer as a factor in determining 
whether there was a reasonable suspicion. 
4. Anderson testified that the area in which the defendant was stopped was inherently 
dangerous. This belief, based on experience and training along with movements made by the 
defendant, reaching for his waistband area and shoulder movement, coupled with his agitated 
state and apparent questioning nature toward Anderson, properly led him to believe that the 
defendant might be armed and dangerous. Anderson was concerned with his immediate safety 
and took the appropriate steps to protect himself and others that may have been in the area. 
5. An officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable belief that the 
suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. 
6. Because the knife was discovered and the officer previously noted the defendant's 
agitated state, it was proper to conclude that he might well be dangerous. Therefore, if 
probable cause did not exist, Anderson was still justified in searching the vehicle due to the 
perceived dangerousness of the defendant. 
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7. The methamphetamine was located in a baggie between the driver's seat and the door 
in plain view after the door was opened. Anderson was not required to ignore the substance. 
After this discovery, Anderson properly placed defendant under arrest. 
8. The search of the capsule attached to the Icnife was justified because the defendant 
was then under arrest and search of the capsule was subsequent lo that arrest. 
DATED this^th day of/Uf^ , 2Cbf. 
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Before GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and JACKSON, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
GREENWOOD. 
*1 Defendant Julio Sosa appeals his conviction for 
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, 
possession of marijuana, and giving false informa-
tion to a police officer. We reverse. 
"When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion to suppress, this court will uphold 
the trial court's underlying findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous."*Stoe v. White, 856 P.2d 
656, 659 (Utah Ct.App.1993). However, "the final 
determination of lawfulness of a detention or search 
is reviewed for correctness. "M 
" To determine whether a search or seizure is con-
stitutionally reasonable, we make a dual inquiry: 
(1) Was the police officer's action "justified at its 
inception"? and (2) Was the resulting detention [or 
search] "reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances that justified the interference in the first 
place?" ' " State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 
(Utah Ct.App.1997) (citations omitted). Using this 
analysis, we conclude the weapons search of de-
fendant was justified under the reasoning of Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), and its 
progeny, but that Sergeant Ashment exceeded the 
scope of the search when he patted down defend-
ant's coin pocket after finding no weapons during 
his initial search. 
Defendant argues the pat-down search for weapons 
was not reasonable because "the only articulable 
facts to support the frisk of Mr. Sosa were the pre-
stop movements of the two suspects and the empty 
cardboard [ammunition] box.'The record, however, 
does not support defendant's assertion. Sergeant 
Ashment had also received information from Ser-
geant Malmborg that the vehicle had not stopped 
immediately when Malmborg signaled the vehicle 
to pull over, that Malmborg had noticed the sus-
pects moving around inside the vehicle and that it 
had appeared they were trying to hide something as 
they stopped the vehicle, that the driver had an out-
standing warrant, and that both suspects had lied 
about their identities. Based on this information 
FN1 and the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant 
Ashment acted reasonably in conducting a weapons 
search of defendant to assure his safety and the 
safety of Sergeant Malmborg. See State v. O'Brien, 
959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (holding de-
fendant's furtive movements in vehicle prior to 
stop, his questionable explanation of those move-
ments, and admission of gun in vehicle justified of-
ficer's search of vehicle). 
FN1. We note that Sergeant Ashment had 
every right to rely on Sergeant Malmborg's 
report of the events prior to Sergeant Ash-
ment's arrival. See Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 
142 ("[A]n officer may rely upon the ob-
servations of fellow officers engaged in a 
common investigation.") Sergeant 
Malmborg's report, together with Sergeant 
Ashment's personal observations, formed 
the reasonable articulable suspicion neces-
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sary to conduct the weapons search of de-
fendant. 
Although Sergeant Ashment's search of defendant 
was justified at its inception, this conclusion does 
not end our inquiry. "The Fourth Amendment pro-
ceeds as much by limitations upon the scope of 
governmental action as by imposing preconditions 
upon its initiation ."See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-29, 
88 S.Ct. at 1883-84. We also must determine if the 
scope of Sergeant Ashment's pat-down of defendant 
was "limited to that which is necessary for the dis-
covery of weapons which might be used to harm 
the officer or others nearby ."A/, at 266, 88 S.Ct. at 
1882. 
*2 At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Ashment 
testified that, after conducting a thorough search of 
defendant in the areas most typically used to hide 
weapons, he did not locate a weapon or any evid-
ence of criminal activity. At that point, the safety of 
both officers was reasonably secured, and the 
search should have ended. See, e.g., State v. Chap-
man, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1995) (reasoning that 
once detainee was known to be unarmed, officers 
would have no reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
continue searching for weapons). By continuing 
with the search and invading defendant's coin pock-
et, Sergeant Ashment impermissibly expanded the 
scope of the frisk beyond that reasonably necessary 
to ascertain the presence of weapons and exceeded 
the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.FN2Con-
sequently, we reverse the trial court's decision 
denying defendant's motion to suppress and vacate 
defendant's conviction. 
FN2. Because we hold that Sergeant Ash-
ment's search of defendant should have 
ended with the initial pat-down, we need 
not address whether the "plain feel" doc-
trine allowed Sergeant Ashment to retrieve 
the cocaine from defendant's coin pocket. 
DAVIS and JACKSON, JJ, concur. 
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